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Conference Paper Abstract 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Drawing on some of the findings of my 2015 thesis: ‘The End of the Admiralty and its Impact 
on British Defence Policy 1955-1964’ [Plymouth University] this paper explores the 
development of the mindset of Admiral Terry Lewin [Royal Navy] as he influenced British 
Naval policy in 1981/82.  It explains the roots and rationale behind Lewin’s methodology in 
tackling the challenges to defence policy as Defence Minister John Nott devised a plan that 
would have resulted in the Royal Navy being significantly reduced and the perception that the 
UK was no longer a maritime nation. It specifically challenges contemporary accounts that 
support that Lewin favoured Louis Mountbatten’s ‘master plan’ from the 1960s for a more 
integrated MoD and gathering more executive power to the role of the Chief of the Defence 
staff [CDS]. By drawing on the thesis, it also mentions that accounts – manipulated by 
Mountbatten – of the creation of the Ministry of Defence, are misleading. This research reveals 
an often-overlooked component of Naval history, this being the Admiralty’s ability to train and 
enforce a culture into Naval personnel to communicate the Navy’s requirements and the 
services role to a range of audiences.  The paper demonstrates a critical link between this 
component, as the Admiralty’s policy came to fruition as Lewin timely advocated Seapower 
and encouraged the First Sea Lord to resist Naval cuts at the precipice of the 1982 Falklands 
War. This identifies the enduring influence of the Admiralty in Britain’s national narrative far 
beyond its demise in 1964. This research resonates with current Naval debates while furthering 
historical analysis by further highlighting the vulnerability of Naval policy to select 
individuals. [5th January 2016].  
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